Resolving Rival Claims on East German Property Upon German Unification by Jeffress, Dorothy Ames
Resolving Rival Claims on East German
Property Upon German Unification
Dorothy Ames Jeffress
One of the most significant problems of German unification is the reinstate-
ment of private property rights in former East Germany. The East German
Government and the Soviet occupying authorities who preceded it expropriated
much of the country's land from private owners.' The state controlled most
property, which was considered "Volkseigentum," or "the people's property."
Because the concept of Volkseigentum does not exist in West German law,2
which treats property much like the American legal system, the difficulty of
merging East Germany into the West German system raises an interesting legal
question of how to adapt an entire system of property to a new legal and
political system. The question is of tremendous importance, since the settlement
of ownership of the properties in question affects over one million claims.'
The separate histories of the two German countries, the Federal Republic
of Germany (FRG) and the German Democratic Republic (GDR), have created
conflicting sources of claims on properties in former East Germany. The
conflicts stem from international and intertemporal legal problems: claims of
West Germans oppose claims of East Germans, and claims from the early
postwar years oppose present claims.
Former deedholders whose properties were expropriated now want them
back. They claim that the takings under the East German Government were
illegal and that their property should be returned. Many of these claimants left
East Germany after the government took their lands. Other claimants abandoned
their properties to flee to the West. The claims of those who left East Germany
conflict with the claims of current residents, who may own the houses in which
1. The Soviet military authorities expropriated 3.3 million hectares of land during the occupation of
East Germany from 1945 to 1949. Henning Krumrey, Neue Milliardenlast, WIRTSCHAFTSWOCHE. June 22,
1990, at 14, 15.
2. The reference to "West German law" rather than "German law" underscores that this law is being
newly applied in eastern Germany. This Note refers to East and West Germany in discussing historical
development and to eastern and western Germany in discussing the present.
3. Over 1.2 million applications for the return of or compensation for expropriated property have been
filed with the agencies responsible for administering the claims. Helmut Schmidt, Uns Deutsche kann der
Teufel holen, DiE ZErr, May 24, 1991, at 3.
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they live, but were never given title to the land underneath.4 The claims of
former owners may, in other instances, clash with long-established public use
of the land. Many interests are at stake: the interests of former owners who
were unfairly dispossessed of their property rights, the interests of current
residents who have established homes, and the interests of the public in main-
taining the stability of publicly used properties. Quick resolution of the property
questions is essential because the reconstruction of the eastern economy requires
speedy elimination of all legal obstacles to investment. The administrative
bodies responsible for adjudicating property claims will have to balance all of
these interests in their decisions.'
As part of the Unification Treaty,6 the two governments agreed to return
property to former owners wherever possible. The most significant agreements
on the property question were part of a Joint Declaration (Declaration) between
the two governments.7 Although these agreements settle much of the conflict,
many questions remain unresolved. The local tribunals that will adjudicate the
claims will have a great deal of discretion in making their decisions. They will
need to determine which ownership claims are legitimate, which properties
should remain undisturbed, which can be returned to rightful owners, and how
to assess property values in cases awarding compensation.
This Note presents the historical and legal background of the German
property question and provides guidance to the administrative decisionmakers.
It advocates that the now-unified German Parliament pass legislation specifying
the criteria and considerations to be weighed in property decisions so that
claims are treated fairly and uniformly throughout the country.8 Part I addresses
the historical and legal context of the property question. It examines the
development of property law and the history of expropriations in East Germany
and the current status of West German property law insofar as it is applicable.
Part II discusses the terms of unification and the agreements the two countries
4. Under the East German regime, about 40% of the citizens owned their houses, but the property on
which the houses stood belonged to the state. Marc Fisher, East Germans Fear Losing Homes, WASH. POST,
July 25, 1990, at A15, A1S. The legal basis for the separation of ownership of land and buildings on the
land is in the ZIVILGESBTZBUCH [ZGB] [CIVIL CODE] § 295(2) (1988) (G.D.R.).
5. Claims are to be filed at local administrative offices: the Landratsamt (office of county administra-
tion) in rural areas and the Stadtverwtaltng (municipal administration) in urban areas. GESETZBLATr DER
DDR, TEtL I [GB1. I], No. 44 (1990).
6. Vertrag zwischen der Bundesrepublik Deutschland und der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik
Uber die Herstellung der Einheit Deutschlands: Einigungsvertrag [Treaty between F.R.G. and G.D.R. on
the Establishment of German Unity: Unification Treaty], art. 4 1. Aug. 31, 1990, 30 I.L.M. 457 [hereinafter
Unification Treaty] (entered into force Sept. 29, 1991).
7. Gemeinsame Erklarung, BULLETIN, June 19, 1990, at 661 para. 3 [hereinafter Declaration] (West
German Government publication). Properties abandoned by East Germans fleeing to the West will be
returned unless such properties have been subsequently occupied by new residents or converted to public
use. Where return of property is not possible because of an intervening owner or an important public purpose
for the land, the government will compensate the former owners. Id. para. 3(a)-(b): see also infra notes 49-
54 and accompanying text.
8. The German Parliament is expected to pass legislation concerning this issue. Immo Stutzbach,
Restoration of Previous Ownership Rights in the German Democratic Republic 3 (Aug. 31, 1990) (unpub-
lished memorandum, on file with author).
[Vol. 101: 527
East German Property
have already reached concerning property issues.9 Part III describes how the
property claims should be adjudicated, according to the needs of justice and
the public interest. This part first addresses the constitutional questions that
have been raised in public debate over existing agreements including constitu-
tional protection of property rights and equal protection claims."t Second, Part
III argues for a policy that the administrative bodies that adjudicate claims
should follow-a policy based on prior international cases involving similar
disputes. The most important factors in setting a policy to resolve property
claims are fairness, predictability, stability, and the public interest. A just
resolution of the property claims according to these criteria is essential to the
efficacy and fairness of the German reunification process.
I. PROPERTY LAW IN EAST AND WEST GERMANY
With the division of Germany into occupied zones at the end of World War
II, the Soviet territory that became East Germany and the British, American,
and French territories that became West Germany began to develop quite
differently. The Soviet authorities imposed a property system that, in keeping
with the communist program, redistributed almost a third of the Soviet-occupied
land during the first four years after the war." In the western territories, by
contrast, the Allies encouraged the development of a capitalist democracy,
which did not materially alter the property system that had existed before the
Nazi era." These differences grew more and more pronounced with the devel-
opment of East and West Germany over the forty years of their separate
existences. The German Government must now assign titles to property in a
country that previously did not recognize the concept of private ownership.'
3
The history of expropriations of property in East Germany demonstrates how
9. The Unification Treaty, supra note 6, and the Declaration, supra note 7, are the major sources of
law on this issue, as read and interpreted within the context of Vest German property law and the West
German Constitution. They are referred to as the "property agreements" throughout this Note.
10. This public debate includes editorial commentary in the press and articles written by German legal
scholars. See infra note 45 and accompanying text.
11. Wolfgang Hoffmann, Sechser im Lotto, DIE ZErr, June 8, 1990, at 34.
12. The Nazis grossly abused property rights by expropriating property from Jews and other minorities.
The property law of Weimar Germany thus provides a more valid comparison for legal purposes. The
protection of property rights under the Weimar Constitution resembles current West German protections.
Compare DIE VERFASSUNG DES DEUTSCHEN REICHS art. 153 (1919) with GRUNDGEETZ [Constitution] [GG1
art. 14.
13. Individuals living in private homes owned them only in the sense that they were permitted to live
on property with the understanding that its upkeep was their responsibility. However, there were no titles
or guarantees of ownership, and all property ownership was administered by the State. Carl Graf Hohenthal,
Zweifelhafte Geschdfte mit Grundstficken undHdluseru, FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE ZEITUNG, May 15, 1990,
at 19. The East German Constitution only permitted expropriations of property in the common interest and
with compensation. DiE VERFASSUNG DER DDR [VERF.1 art. 16 (1968). However, this protection was more
nominal than actual, since citizens were not permitted to challenge government expropriations. The first
complaint contesting government compensation to be admitted in court was taken on July 1, 1989.
Hohenthal, supra, at 19.
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difficult it will be to implement a private property system after so many years
without one.
A. The Development of Property Law in East Germany
1. Historical Background
According to the Marxist ideology adopted by the East German Govern-
ment, private ownership of the means of production, including property, is the
primary means of oppression. 4 The East German state determined the best
use of property for the collective good. Accordingly, much property in East
Germany was considered socialist property, or Volkseigentum.' 5 Through land
reforms, expropriations, and forced collectivizations, most property in East
Germany became socialist property.16
The first stage of collectivization began in 1945 when the Soviet military
government expropriated all properties larger than 100 hectares. 17 This land
reform so dramatically altered the preexisting system of property ownership that
it violated the international law of military occupation. 8 According to Article
43 of the Hague Regulations, occupying powers are obliged to respect the laws
in force in the occupied territory unless they are "absolutely prevented" from
doing so.' 9 Because widespread expropriation of land was not a necessary
14. Marx and Engels wrote: "[T]he theory of the Communists may be summed up in the single
sentence: Abolition of private property." KARL MARX & FRIEDRICH ENGELS, THE COMMUNIST MANIFESTO
27 (Paul M. Sweezy trans., 1964); see also Wolfgang Kilian, Die Frage Nummer I in der DDR: Wem
geh6ren Grund und Boden?, DIE WELT, May 9, 1990, at 8.
15. Kilian, supra note 14, at 8. East German statutes refer to the Volkseigentum and cooperative
property as the economic basis of the development of socialism in East Germany. GBI. I, No. 140 (1952).
16. Carl Graf Hohenthal, Unrentable ProduktionsgrSfien in der Landwirtschaft, FRANKFURTER
ALLGEMEINE ZEITUNG, May 16, 1990, at 19.
17. Id.
18. The governing law of military occupation at the end of World War II was the Hague Convention
(IV) Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, Oct. 18, 1907, 205 Consol. T.S. 277, reprinted
in DOCUMENTS ON THE LAWS OF WAR 44 (Adam Roberts & Richard Guelff eds., 1982) [hereinafter Hague
Convention], and its accompanying regulations, Annex to the Convention, Oct. 18, 1907, 205 Consol. T.S.
289, reprinted in DOCUMENTS ON THE LAWS OF WAR, supra, at 48. There is some debate about whether
the Allies were subject to the laws of military occupation. Some scholars argue that the total defeat of
Germany gave the Allies the status of sovereign authority. Eyal Benvenisti, Conflict of Laws and Belligerent
Occupation: A Study in Comparative and International Law 206-10 (1990) (unpublished J.S.D. dissertation,
Yale Law School). It makes more sense in light of the basic principles of international law, however, to
view the Allied presence in the postwar period as military occupation, not sovereign authority. Benvenisti
argues persuasively that the Hague Regulations did apply, because the Allies did not automatically assume
sovereignty as a result of the military victory. Benvenisti explains: "As sovereignty lies in the people and
not in their government, the fact that their army has been totally defeated cannot divest them of their
entitlement." Id. at 209. Thus, the Hague Regulations did apply to the postwar allied occupations. Id. at
208.
19. Article 43 of ihe Hague Regulations reads as follows: "The authority of the legitimate power having
in fact passed into the hands of the occupant, the latter shall take all the measures in his power to restore,
and ensure, as far as possible, public order and safety, while respecting, unless absolutely prevented, the
laws in force in the country." Hague Convention, supra note 18, at 55-56 (emphasis added) (footnote
omitted).
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reform and clearly violated the system of land ownership that was still in place
at the war's end, the expropriation was illegal under the Hague Regulations.
This illegality is an important factor in arguments made by those who lost their
lands during the Soviet occupation and whose properties were not included in
the agreement to return or compensate. 20
The East German Government continued to nationalize property by estab-
lishing agricultural cooperatives.21 Farmers and new settlers were forced into
these cooperatives, but had no control over their operations, which were large
and inefficient.' As a result, collectivization had drastic consequences-not
only for the individuals who lost their property, but also for the economic
development of eastern Germany. Now the new government must dismantle
the cooperatives both to reinstate individual citizens' property rights and to
reprivatize the eastern economy so that it can compete within the unified
German agricultural system. Both of these goals must be considered in the
reallocation of property rights.
2. Status as of November 1989
The status of property ownership prior to 1989, when the East German
Government destabilized and the process of reunification began, is impossible
to define clearly in legal terms.3 Now that private property is being reintro-
duced, who should be entitled to ownership rights of the many concerns and
factories characterized as the "People's Own Business"?' During East Ger-
many's forty years of existence, almost all of the nation's property ultimately
came under state control. Yet state control was often de jure, since the residents
of the property or operators of farms and businesses had actual responsibility
for the property. These responsibilities did not constitute legal property owner-
ship.
Although East German statutes provided laws on property ownership, they
were not necessarily followed. While East German civil law, like the West
German system, stated that property ownership changed upon entry in the
property register, or Grundbuch,'- this formal system deteriorated so much
during the 1970's that the Grundbuch fell into desuetude.26 Similarly, East
20. See discussion infra Part III.A.3.
21. The Landwirtschaftliche Produktionsgenossenschaften, or agricultural cooperatives, were formed
according to a 1952 directive. Verordnung zur Sicherung von Vermoigenswerten [Decree on the Securing
of Assets], July 17, 1952. GBI. I. No.100 (1952).
22. Hohenthal, supra note 16, at 19.
23. Kilian, supra note 14, at 8.
24. Vollseigener Betrieb is the typical nomenclature for businesses in East Germany. Article 25 of the
Unification Treaty assigned most of these properties to the Treuhandanstalt, the trustee agency now in the
process of privatizing these industries. See Privatisierung durch Trethandanstalt, DEUTSCHLAND NACHRICH-
TEN, Feb. 8, 1991, at 5; Trustee Agency Branches Privatize 240 Firms, THE WEEK IN GERMANY, Jan. 25,
1991, at 4.
25. ZGB § 26(2) (1988).
26. Telephone interview with Immo Stutzbach, West German lawyer (Mar. 29, 1991).
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German law did not provide the same protections for real estate as it did for
movable property, further demonstrating the unimportance of private property
within East Germany.'
Without more legal guidance than presently exists, the decisionmaking
authorities will have great difficulty resolving claims. Former East German
citizens are understandably concerned that without title to the property they
have used for years and with all of the country's investment capital flowing
from western Germany, they will be bought out by West Germans enforcing
prior ownership claims and seeking low cost investments. Thus, resolution of
the property problem must respond to the eastern German residents' need for
a stable assignment of property ownership.
B. Relevance of West German Property Laws
The East German property takings described above would have been illegal
under West German law.28 But what relevance does West German property
law have to the events in former East Germany? Should West German law have
any bearing on the acts of another sovereign state that affected only that state's
citizens? One West German lawyer, Klaus K6pp of the Social Democratic
Party, argues that when a sovereign government expropriates property from its
citizens for political or economic purposes, as was the case in East Germany,
other sovereign governments must recognize the expropriations as long as the
state acted within the boundaries of its own authority.29 Yet three significant
legal and political issues make the severance of West German legal norms from
the East German property problem more complex than this argument suggests.
First, the policies underlying the legal principles of state succession support
the recognition of property claims in East Germany. If German unification were
a simple case of state succession, a doctrine of sovereign immunity, such as
K6pp describes, could apply. However, the German situation is atypical. The
German Government, in the course of incorporating the former East German
states into a unified Germany, has assumed responsibility for the former East
German Government's rule.30 Furthermore, the rules of state succession gener-
ally apply to a state's obligations to another state, rather than to its own citi-
zens. Therefore, the most important international agreement on state succession,
27. There is no law of estoppel by laches with respect to real estate in East Germany, although an
estoppel law does apply to movable property. An owner of movable property loses the ownership right after
ten years if someone else has taken possession without knowledge of the prior owner. ZGB § 32(2). West
German law recognizes estoppel by laches forreal estate, BORGERLICHES GEsETZBUcH [BGB] [CIVIL CODE)
§ 900 (5th ed. 1990) (F.R.G.), but East German law contains no such provision.
28. See infra Part III.A.
29. Hoffmann, supra note 11, at 34 (quoting statement of Klaus Kdpp).
30. The Unification Treaty does permit the new government to reconsider some of the unwanted
obligations of the East German Government. For example, Article 12(1) specifies that East Germany's treaty
obligations are to be renegotiated by the new government. Unification Treaty, supra note 6, art. 12(1).
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the Vienna Convention on Succession of States in Respect of Treaties,3 does
not apply. Nevertheless, the basic policy underlying the Convention, which
reflects the general principles of the international law of state succession, may
be instructive in this context. Those principles attempt to strike a balance
between the need for stability and continuity and the need to promote beneficial
change.
2
The settlement of conflicting claims to East German property implicates
both of these imperatives. In honoring legitimate claims to property, the new
German Government accomplishes both objectives of the law of state succes-
sion: it promotes continuity in the international system, and it facilitates needed
reforms. By taking on the responsibilities of the East German Government it
succeeded, the new German Government performs its obligation under the
international laws of state succession. At the same time, by making payments
to individuals whose property was taken without just compensation by the East
German Government, the new German Government can promote the interests
of justice and fairness. Thus, the policies underlying the international law of
state succession suggest that the new German Government should not respect
the East German Government's expropriations as the valid acts of another
sovereign, but should exercise its own control over its land and citizens to
rectify the past injustices of the East German Government.
A second justification for the recognition of property claims is that the
West German Government never fully accepted the legitimacy of the East
German state.33 The West German Government thus had no obligation to
recognize acts of the East German Government, because East Germany was not
a sovereign state according to West German policy. The West German Govern-
ment never abandoned its policy of advocating and striving for the eventual
reunification of East and West Germany.34 It worded agreements with the East
German Government very carefully so as to grant only the most minimal legal
recognition of the East German Government possible.35 West Germany's
persistent resistance to recognizing the sovereignty of the East German Govern-
31. Vienna Convention on Succession of States in Respect of Treaties, Aug. 22, 1978, 17 I.L.M. 1488
(delineating obligations of successor states to honor treaties of states they succeed). The International Law
Commission has drafted articles that would arguably apply to the obligation to former East German citizens
because they involve the assumption by successor states of "any ... financial obligation chargeable to a
State." Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of its 32d Sess., U.N. GAOR Int'l L.
Comm'n, 35th Sess., Supp. No. 10, at 11. U.N. Doc. A/35/10 (1980). These articles are not yet law, but
are valuable as indicators of the future course of the international law on state succession.
32. See MYRES S. McDOUGAL & V. MICHAEL REISMAN, INTERNATIONAL LAW IN CONTEMPORARY
PERSPECTIVE 1553-54 (1981).
33. Ernest Plock remarks that "Bonn substantially, but notformally, extended recognition to the GDR"
in signing a significant treaty in 1972. ERNEST D. PLOCK, THE BASIC TREATY AND THE EVOLUTION OF
EAST-WEST GERMAN RELATIONS 3 (1986) (emphasis added).
34. This policy was manifest in the Grundgesetz. GG pmbl., arts. 23, 146 (amended 1990).
35. See PLOCK, supra note 33, at 26-27. The nonrecognition policy was so important that for many
years the West German Government pursued the "HalIstein Doctrine," whereby West Germany would sever
diplomatic relations with any state that recognized the GDR. Id. at 10 n.4.
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ment relieved it of any obligation to acknowledge the legitimacy of that govern-
ment's actions.
Finally, and perhaps even more salient than the legal justifications for the
recognition of claims, the new German Government would encounter political
difficulties if it refused to repair the East German expropriations. West German
citizens have demanded that the German Government return their dispossessed
properties now that it controls them. Interest groups have lobbied hard to
pressure the new German Government to honor these claims.36 Given the
already volatile political climate in unified Germany, the politicians negotiating
the unification agreement felt significant pressure from these citizens. The
interest groups became powerful political actors during the negotiation of the
Unification Treaty and forced the government to address the issue of property
claims. Thus, the combination of political pressure, international law, and West
German law support a policy of recognizing property claims in East Germany.
II. RELEVANT PROVISIONS OF THE UNIFICATION AGREEMENTS
The Declaration, the East and West German Governments' agreement to
return property to former owners whenever possible, resolved many of the
difficult property questions that arose during the unification process.37 The
parties prefaced the Declaration with a statement of the policy justifications
underlying their agreement, 38 which listed goals of legal clarity, legal certainty,
and conformity to preexisting property law principles.39 The preface conceded
that the agreement would not fully satisfy the interests of all concerned parties,
since that could not be done without "substituting old injustices with new
ones."
40
The negotiators from West and East Germany represented the divergent
interests of their respective constituencies. The West German claimants and
interest groups wanted as much property as possible to be returned to former
owners.4" East German citizens wanted protection from the loss of their prop-
36. These groups include the Interessengemeinschaft der DDR-Enteigneten (Interest Group of Persons
Expropriated by the GDR) and the Arbeitsgemeinschaftfzir Agrarfragen in der DDR (Working Group on
Agriculture in the GDR). Enteignzungen zwischen 1945 und 1949 fiberprfifen, HANDELSBLATr, June 29, 1990,
at 8; Enteignete sind enttiuscht, FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE ZEITUNG, Sept. 5, 1990, at 2.
37. Declaration, supra note 7. The Declaration was negotiated primarily by the Staatssekreire of West




41. With respect to industrial properties, the eastern Germans have a particular interest in preserving
jobs in their communities. Western Germans who want business properties returned argue that present
business concerns cannot compete in the unified economy and therefore should be given to the entrepreneurs,
who can restructure them. While the government must put the eastern economy back on its feet, it also must
balance reforms with the soaring unemployment that economic reform may bring. Economic hardship in
eastern Germany has increased sharply since reunification, resulting in large demonstrations for more
economic assistance to the new German states. Weiter Unruhe in der Ex-DDR, DEUTSCHLAND NACHRICHT-
EN, Mar. 29, 1991, at 1-2.
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erty and from the financial hardship threatened by compensatory payments to
former owners.4 2 As a result of the agreement, East Germans will have to
accept that expropriated properties will be returned to former owners, although
some exceptions were negotiated to protect their interests.4 3
This part of the Note analyzes the provisions of the Declaration and the
related portion of the Unification Treaty in greater detail. These provisions
resolve many, although not all, of the issues of East German property owner-
ship. Part III of the Note will focus on the unresolved questions.
A. Provisions of the Declaration
1. Properties Expropriated Between 1945 and 1949
The first provision of the Declaration-that none of the lands expropriated
by the Soviets between 1945 and 1949 are to be returned-sparked an imme-
diate controversy.45 Although the provision excludes claims to Soviet-expropri-
ated lands from those to be redressed,46 the Declaration does not render a final
decision on the issue. Instead, it provides that the united German parliament
will make the final determination on compensating such claims.47
42. Although East German support for unification with West Germany was overwhelming, this
sentiment was not necessarily an indication of overwhelming support for all aspects of the West German
system. The property dispute is one area where the interests of the two populations diverge.
43. While the negotiators considered the interests of East Germans, East Germany's Krause was hardly
an equal player in the reunification agreement. The West German treaty proposal was basically the one
adopted, and the Vest German Government clearly dominated the process, both politically and economically.
Timothy G. Ash, Germany Unbound, N.Y. REV. BOOKs, Nov. 22, 1990, at I1.
44. Declaration, supra note 7, para. 1.
45. T"vo well-known jurists published arguments concerning this provision in the Frankfjirter Allge-
raeine Zeitung. See Hans H. von Arnim, Entzttg der Grundrechte aus Opportunitt?, FRANKFURTER
ALLGEMEINE ZEITUNG, Sept. 6, 1990, at 8 (attacking provision as violating constitutional rights); Edzard
Schmidt-Jortzig, Sind nicht in Wahrheit bloi Hoffnungen enttuscht worden?, FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE
ZEITUNG, Sept. 22, 1990, at 10 (defending constitutionality of provision and arguing that question is political,
not constitutional, issue).
46. The Soviet authorities expropriated over one-third of former East Germany. Because of the size
of the takings, resolution of these claims is of great importance. 1945-1949 Nationalization of Property
Ruled Constitutional, THE WEEK IN GER1~iANY, Apr. 26, 1991, at 4 [hereinafter 1945-1949 Nationalization].
47. Declaration, supra note 7, para. 1. The German Constitutional Court preempted legislative
consideration of the Soviet expropriation problem by issuing a decision on April 23, 1991, on the constitu-
tionality of the exclusion of these lands from those to be returned. Judgment of Apr. 23, 1991, BVerfG,
18 Europiische Grundrechte Zeitschrift [EuGRZ] 121 (1991). Fourteen former landowners who lost property
during the Soviet occupation sued for the return of their lands. 1945-1949 Nationalization, supra note 46.
The court ruled that the claimants to these lands do not have a constitutional right to the return of their
properties, but do have the right to compensation for their losses. 18 EuGRZ at 131. The decision effected
a compromise: the landowners will be compensated, but the economy will not be shaken by the reallocation
of one-third of the territory of eastern Germany. For further discussion of the decision, see infra notes 73-94
and accompanying text.
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2. Trustee Holdings Dissolved
The Declaration provides that all properties currently in state-controlled
trusteeships, mostly properties seized after the owners fled East Germany, will
be returned to those owners.48 The more recently the owners left, the less
likely it is that the government has found another use for their land. Therefore,
the chances are very high that recently departed owners will repossess their
property.
3. Expropriated Property Returned-With Exceptions
The West German claimants' key achievement is the provision mandating
that property expropriated by the East German Government is to be returned.
Yet three significant exceptions dilute the force of this provision.49 First, any
property that has been altered in the conversion to common use, such as a
former single-family home that is now used for community housing or business
purposes, cannot be returned to former owners. In these cases, the claimants
will receive compensation of an unspecified nature to make up for their loss-
es.5
0
The second exception applies to private, rather than communal, use of
property. In cases where East Germans currently live on the property in dispute,
the government can offer property of comparable value or compensation rather
than return the original property. This is the only reasonable solution to the
problem of current occupancy because the East Germans who have settled into
the homes of those who abandoned them deserve fair treatment and stability.
One twist on this provision is that the current occupants of the property must
have obtained the property "by honest means" 2 -a provision that will be open
to a great deal of interpretation by the administrative bodies that adjudicate
these claims.53
The final exception provides that any former owner may receive compen-
sation in lieu of her property.5 4 This provision guarantees that former owners
who do not wish to regain their property will still be compensated for the loss.
48. Declaration, supra note 7, para. 2.
49. Id. paras. 3, 4.
50. Id. para. 3(a).
51. Id. para. 3(b).
52. Id. According to one news report, this qualifier was intended in part to throw out all claims to
property that was bought up in anticipation of the opening of the Berlin Wall and the real estate boom. See
Gesetz mit vielen Ausnahmen, DER SPIEGEL, Oct. 8, 1990, at 50. Another possible target of this phrase is
property obtained through means popularly considered illegitimate, for example as a reward for spying or
other government favors.
53. Declaration, supra note 7, para. 3(b). The Declaration specifically states that the particulars of this
exception have yet to be settled. Id.
54. Id. para. 3(c).
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4. Return of Expropriated Businesses
Former owners of businesses that were nationalized are entitled to the
return of their assets or to a portion of the business or its stock, depending on
the size of their former ownership share.55 They may also elect to receive
compensation instead of their properties.5 6 The procedures for applying these
provisions, including the arrangements for the sale and privatization of business-
es, have yet to be determined.
5. Corruption or Abuse of Power Annuls Property Rights
Under this provision, which is similar to the one permitting East German
citizens to retain their properties only if they acquired them honestly, claimants
from the West are not entitled to property rights if those rights were acquired
through dishonest means, such as misuse of power, corruption, coercion, or
deception.57 This provision both prevents legitimation of property rights
wrongly acquired and protects East German citizens who have been cheated,
particularly by corrupt government officials.
6. Administrative Provisions
The agreement includes several administrative provisions to facilitate the
processing of claims and to ensure fairness. The Declaration requires that the
GDR set a deadline for filing claims.58 It also mandates the creation of a
special fund for compensation payments that is separate from the regular
government budget.59 Finally, the Declaration provides that any properties for
which ownership rights are in dispute may not be sold until the question of
ownership is resolved.
60
B. Provisions Added to Declaration By Unification Treaty
Article 41 of the Unification Treaty incorporates all of the provisions of
the Declaration. As part of the treaty, the provisions have more legal authority
than they had as part of a joint declaration.6 In an effort to ensure that the
55. Id. paras. 6, 7.
56. Id.
57. Id. para. 8.
58. Id. para. 13(b). This deadline was originally set for January 31, 1991, but in order to encourage
investment as rapidly as possible, the East German Government moved it to October 13, 1990. Thomas
Thierau & Albrecht Tintelnot, Unklarheiten und Verwirrende Regelungen bei Ruckgewdhr enteigneten
Vermigens, HANDELSBLAITr, Aug. 20, 1990, at 12.
59. Declaration, supra note 7, para. 13(c).
60. Id. para. 13(d). This provision ensures that the processing of claims will not be further complicated
by transactions that occur while ownership rights are being settled.
61. Eigentum, Finanzen, Privatisierung, DIE ZEIT, Sept. 5, 1990, at B 1.
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settlement of property questions will not interfere with urgently needed invest-
ment in the East German economy, Article 41 adds an important qualification
to the agreement by creating an exception to the basic policy favoring the return
of property.
The exception in Article 41 provides that real estate or buildings will not
be returned if they are required for urgent investment purposes, particularly for
the establishment of an industrial enterprise that creates or safeguards jobs.62
This provision has generated a great deal of controversy because it potentially
jeopardizes all property claims. One commentator has called the provision a
"license for dubious profiteers,"6 3 asserting that any investor could feign an
intention to create jobs with a new business while actually intending nothing
more than a profitable real estate deal. Others have criticized the provision for
pulling the rug out from under legitimate claimants.' In order to safeguard
against such behavior, a magistrate must hear the objections of property claim-
ants before approving any investment proposal made under this clause. A
hearing does not eliminate uncertainty, however, as it is difficult to predict how
lenient the magistrates will be with potential investment claims. The investment
provision exemplifies the sharp conflict between two of the basic goals in
settling the property questions: the need to foster rapid investment and the need
to preserve individual rights.
C. Subsequent Legislation
Article 41 specifies that the investment exception will be delineated in
subsequent legislation. The resultant law has recently been ratified, and it
extends the investment exception even further.65 The new law restricts the
policy favoring the return of properties over compensation. Under the new
provisions, compensation will be preferred if the use of the property in question
will secure or create jobs, provide housing, or serve to build up the economic
infrastructure of the region.
66
The passage of this legislation has rekindled the debate that surrounded the
investment exception to Article 41. On the one hand, the escalating crisis in
eastern Germany, which indicates a dire need for swift economic improvement
in the region, has bolstered the arguments for laws encouraging investment.
67
62. Unification Treaty, supra note 6, art. 41, para. 2.
63. Gesetz mit vielen Ausnahmen, supra note 52, at 71.
64. Telephone interview with Hans Bertram-Nothnagel, lawyer representing West German client whose
claim is currently jeopardized by potential investor (Nov. 18, 1990).
65. Beigelegt, Dt ZErr, Mar. 22, 1991, at 1; Bundestag erleichtert Privatisierung im Osten, DEUTSCH-
LAND NACHRICHTEN, Mar. 22, 1991, at 5.
66. New Law on Ownership to Spur hivestments in Ex-GDR, THE WEEK IN GERMANY, Mar. 29, 1991,
at 4.
67. There have been large protests in eastern German industrial areas, see supra note 41, and violence
over the government's economic policies has increased, as reflected by the recent assassination of Detlev
Rohwedder, head of the Treuhandanstalt. The Red Army Faction, a left wing terrorist organization, took
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The situation has become so severe that the Minister of Economics, Jiirgen
M61lemann, has waged a public campaign against the property agreements,
arguing that the threat of economic collapse in eastern Germany is of greater
public importance than the return of property.68 On the other hand, the Minis-
ter of Justice, Dr. Klaus Kinkel, has emphasized the need for justice for former
owners.69 Ultimately, the German Parliament compromised between the posi-
tions of the two ministers by augmenting Article 41. Additional invest-
ment-spurring exceptions to the return policy have been legislated, but the
government continues to adhere to the basic policy of favoring return over
compensation.
70
III. RESOLVING OPEN PROPERTY QUESTIONS
Despite the agreements described in Part II, several property issues remain
unresolved. Commentators, jurists, and others involved in public debate over
the Unification Treaty have challenged the constitutionality of several aspects
of the agreement. They have particularly objected to the exclusion of properties
expropriated between 1945 and 194971 and to the early deadline of October
13, 1990, that was set for the filing of claims.72 The decision of the Bundes-
verfassungsgericht'3 resolved some of these issues, but failed to address all
of the constitutional arguments. The first section of this part argues that these
constitutional challenges are legally unfounded and that policy justifications
support most of the challenged provisions.
In addition to claims concerning the legitimacy of the Declaration, unre-
solved questions concerning the implementation of the compensation system
still remain. It is unclear how a claim will be compensated if it is valid, but
the property cannot be returned. Given the numerous exceptions to the policy
favoring return of property, many claims will fall into this category. The second
section of this part presents policy justifications and recommendations for the
German Government in setting forth guidelines for the adjudication of these
claims.
responsibility for the killing. Stephen Kinzer, Red Army Faction is Suspected in German Killing, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 3, 1991, at A5.
68. Drohng mit dem Rficktritt, DIE ZEIT, Mar. 15, 1991, at 9.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 10.
71. See, e.g., von Arnim, supra note 45.
72. Some claimants may have missed this deadline, particularly foreigners who were not following
the progress of the agreements. Telephone interview with Immo Stutzbach, West German lawyer (Nov. 16,
1990).
73. Judgment of Apr. 23, 1991, BVerfG 18 EuGrZ 121 (1991) (F.R.G.). See discussion supra note 47
and accompanying text.
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A. Challenges to Property Agreements
Constitutional challenges to the property agreements are principally based
on two articles of the Grundgesetz: Article 3 ("Equality")74 and Article 14
("Guarantee of Property Rights"). 75
1. Equality
Article 3(1) provides that all persons shall be equal before the law.76
Those claimants whose properties were expropriated between 1945 and 1949
have argued that their exclusion from the provisions of the Declaration is a
denial of equality under Article 3(1). The Bundesverfassungsgericht heard this
argument and decided that although the denial of return of the properties
expropriated before 1949 is lawful, failure to compensate these claimants would
constitute a denial of equality.
77
The Bundesverfassungsgericht based its decision largely on the political
framework surrounding the challenged provision of the Unification Treaty. The
court fully recognized the constraints hampering the West German Government
during the negotiation of the Unification Treaty.7" The court explained that
the Unification Treaty was the product of the so-called "2+4" negotiations,
79
which essentially took place between the two Germanies but were contingent
upon the consent of the four occupying powers. During these negotiations, the
East German and Soviet Governments refused to permit the return of properties
expropriated during the Soviet occupation. Because they presented this condi-
tion as nonnegotiable, the West German Government had to accede to their
wishes to achieve unification.
The court deferred to the compromise because negotiating the agreement
furthered the constitutionally mandated goal of restoring German unity, which
was dictated in the preamble of the Grundgesetz.0 Because the West German
Government was constitutionally bound to pursue unification, allowing the
Soviet expropriations to stand as lawful was judged to be a necessary sacri-
fice.81
Although the West German Government was unable to provide for the
return of the Soviet-expropriated properties, it was not precluded from compen-
sating the claims to those properties. The nonnegotiable condition of assent to
74. GG art. 3.
75. GG art. 14.
76. GG art. 3(1).
77. 18 EuGRZ at 131.
78. Id. at 126, 131.
79. Id. at 131.
80. The preamble called upon the entire German people to pursue the unification of Germany. GG
pmbl. (repealed Sept. 23, 1990).
81. 18 EuGrZ at 128.
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unification was that these properties remain undisturbed, not that they remain
uncompensated.8 2 Consequently, the court held that the guarantee of equality
required that claimants to properties expropriated before 1949 and claimants
to properties expropriated after 1949 be treated alike whenever possible. 3
2. Guarantee of Property Rights
According to Article 14 of the Grundgesetz, the German Government is
obligated to protect and guarantee property rights.' Expropriations are permit-
ted only when they serve the general public and when the owner is compensat-
ed.8 1 In addition, they are subject to court appeal.8 6 The expropriations car-
ried out by the East German Government violated this article. The constitutional
question is whether Article 14 should apply to the events in East Germany.
Several pressing legal arguments demonstrate that Article 14 should not
apply to the East German expropriations. First, according to Article 23, the
Grundgesetz only applies to West German territories. This Article explicitly
states that the Grundgesetz would apply to other German territories only after
their accession.87 Second, the Grundgesetz did not become valid until May
24, 1949.88 This fact provides clear support for the decision not to compensate
expropriations by the Soviets, which occurred before the adoption of the Grund-
gesetz8 9 Those who argue that the constitutional rights of victims of pre-1949
expropriations are not being granted are correct in asserting that these expropri-
ations would have violated the West German Constitution had it applied, but
they err in arguing for the application of the Grundgesetz in this context.
The decision of the Bundesverfassungsgericht offers a different interpreta-
tion of the application of Article 14.90 The court decided that although the
property agreements may have violated Article 14's guarantee of property
rights, other constitutional imperatives took precedence over Article 14.91 The
constitutional mandate to pursue restoration of German unity required the
government to deny the return of Soviet-expropriated properties. 92 The court
also held that because the government lawfully incorporated the property
agreements into Article 143 of the Grundgesetz, any resulting conflicts with
Article 14 were lawful.
93
82. Id. at 131.
83. Id.
84. GG art. 14(1).
85. GG art. 14(3).
86. Id.
87. GG art. 23 (repealed Sept. 23, 1990).
88. See GG art. 145; see also HANS D. JARASS & BODO PIEROTH, GRUNDGESETZ FOR DIE BUNDES-
REPUBLIK DEUTSCHLAND 752 (1989) (annotated West German Copititution).
89. See Schmidt-Jortzig, supra note 45.
90. 18 EuGrZ 121, 121 (1991).
91. Id. at 128.
92. See discussion supra note 80 and accompanying text.
93. 18 EuGrZ at 128, 129.
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The decision of the Bundesverfassungsgericht demonstrates that constitu-
tional challenges to the property agreements will not succeed beyond establish-
ing a right to compensation in some form. The court recognized the financial
constraints unification has imposed upon the government and therefore left the
German legislature much latitude to determine what that compensation should
be.94 Those claimants who remain unsatisfied with the existing agreements
have heard from the court; now they must focus their attention on lobbying the
legislature for a high standard of compensation.
3. Fairness of Property Agreements
The decision of the Bundesverfassungsgericht held that it is unconstitutional
for the government to differentiate among various categories of claims when
deciding whether to award compensation, yet upheld the return of only one
group of claims. Apart from the constitutionality of this structure, a question
remains as to whether the measures reached in the agreements best promote
a fair and sensible settlement of the property issue.
Because only a quick settlement of property disputes can ensure investors
of the stability of property ownership, the government must impose filing
requirements so that claims will be processed rapidly. Investors are still hesitant
about buying East German businesses and land due to the seeming fragility of
any current title. Thus, the prompt filing requirement is necessary to determine
which properties are disputed and which are not. For similar reasons, the
impetus still exists to adjudicate the filed claims as quickly as possible: this is
the main reason for swiftly promulgating guidelines on awarding compensation
or returning property.
These efficiency arguments are not, however, persuasive enough to justify
the exclusion of the pre-1949 expropriations from those to be redressed. First,
distinguishing between the East German and Soviet authorities who carried out
the expropriations is not a valid criterion for the government to use in determin-
ing which claims to honor.9 5 It may seem reasonable for the consolidated
German Government to respond to unlawful actions of the East German Gov-
ernment but not to the actions of the Soviet occupation forces on the grounds
that a closer link exists between East Germany and the new German Govern-
ment than exists between unified Germany and the Soviet occupiers. However,
the Soviet expropriations violated the law of military occupation and thus
impose an international obligation-of moral, not legal, persuasion-to seek
justice for the injured parties. This obligation is just as serious as the obligation
to make reparations for the East German expropriations. The decision of the
Bundesverfassungsgericht brokered an effective compromise between fairness
94. Id. at 130.
95. See discussion supra text accompanying notes 82-83.
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and efficiency considerations in mandating compensation, but not return, for
the properties taken during the Soviet occupation.
A practical argument against including the pre-1949 expropriations is that
the records of these takings have been destroyed. 96 In contrast, the East Ger-
man expropriations are supposedly documented in the records of the land
registry. The lack of available records would make adjudicating claims from
1945 to 1949 considerably more difficult than those of later years and would
tax the efficiency and timeliness of property reassignment. This argument
applies, however, to more of the claims being considered than just the Soviet
expropriations. Many entries in the East German records have been falsified,
and pages have been torn from the books.97 The claims resolution process will
be difficult both for claims originating under the East German Government and
for those arising under the Soviet occupiers. Yet inadequate records should not
justify the exclusion of an entire set of expropriations from reparations. In
determining how to compensate these losses, the legislature should anticipate
recordkeeping problems and simplify the compensation guidelines in order to
minimize the papers necessary for making a claim.
B. Guidelines for Local Authorities in Adjudicating Claims
This section delineates the criteria that should be used by local decision-
making authorities as they process the claims of former owners. So far, over
one million claims have been filed at local and municipal offices.98 The duties
of local administrative authorities, who had very little responsibility under the
East German system, are suddenly increasing exponentially. It will take a long
time and a great deal of guidance to overcome the bureaucratic obstacles left
by the former East German Government.
The difficulties in using the decentralized East German bureaucracy suggest
that it would have been wiser to create a new administrative body to hear these
claims. The advantages of such a system would be managerial simplicity and
uniformity of adjudicative processes and decisions. This approach was probably
not taken because preexisting local authorities are familiar with the properties
at issue and thus are more qualified to weigh the benefits of maintaining the
property's current use against those of returning it to the former owners.
It is also possible that keeping the decisionmaking authority local was a
negotiated tradeoff. The interests of the two populations are quite different on
this issue, so decisionmakers from the two populations would likewise prefer
different resolutions. The East German negotiator may have agreed to return
legitimately claimed property on the condition that the decisions be made by
96. Kilian, supra note 14.
97. Die Rfickgabe ostdeutscher Vermdgen stdflt atif Schwierigkeiten, FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE
ZErtUNG, Dec. 20, 1990, at 19.
98. See Schmidt, supra note 3.
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local authorities on a case-by-case basis. This system retains some power for
the East Germans and includes them in deciding the future of the land they
currently occupy. It also addresses the interests of public stability and satisfac-
tion with the property agreements. Tension in the former East German territo-
ries would increase if there were no local control over property settlements.
Such tension would be harmful not only to current residents, but also to an
owner who returned to her former property to confront a hostile neighborhood.
Allowing local bodies to make decisions concerning property claims in their
districts alleviates this tension.
Nevertheless, the disadvantage of decentralized decisionmaking and the
need for maximum stability and predictability suggest that the legislature should
provide as much guidance as possible to the local officials. The next two
sections will set forth some of the criteria that the legislature should adopt.
1. Remedy: Return or Compensation?
The first decision to be made about any legitimate99 claim is whether to
return the property to the claimant or to maintain its current use and monetarily
compensate the claimant. This decision depends entirely on the current use of
the property. The decisionmakers should examine the value and legitimacy of
the property's current use. A range of typical scenarios will demonstrate the
application of these criteria.
There will be many claims by former residents for the return of homes in
which former East Germans currently live. Such residential use should be
presumed legitimate: these homes should almost never be returned to former
owners. Former East German citizens, who never enjoyed protection of property
rights from their government, should not have their homes taken by their new
democratic government. Because of the fundamental importance of the home,
residential use is clearly legitimate and of the highest value.1°° These criteria
99. All claims should be compared with administrative records to ensure that fraudulent claims are not
honored. Because these records are kept locally, decisions should be made by the local administrative offices.
Fraudulent records present another problem; the extent of tampering in the East German records can be fully
assessed only as claims are processed. In delegating so much authority to the local agencies, however, the
government must monitor the process to avoid corruption in the processing of claims. Local agencies should
be required to document and state reasons for their decisions so that the process can be overseen by
disinterested parties.
100. There may be some exceptions to this rule, such as where former government officials or other
persons rewarded under the Communist system (such as world-class athletes) have obtained large houses
or estates because of their positions. The legitimacy of such use is doubtful, since the property was often
obtained through means that the general public considers corrupt. One example of this scenario is the
Wandlitz settlement, where former East German leaders, such as Erich Honecker, lived. See Adam Pertman,
A German Paradise of Quotable People, BOSTON GLOBE, Dec. 25, 1989, at 44. The authorities concealed
this settlement from the public; the roads leading into the area did not even appear on published maps.
The illegitimacy of this sort of property use can hardly be disputed. There was tremendous outcry when
the public learned how well Honecker and his colleagues lived. Admittedly, these officials lived moderately
by Western standards, but their lifestyles were lavish in comparison to the rest of the East German
population. These individuals deserve due process, but they do not deserve to keep property unjustly
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will at times be difficult for decisionmakers to apply, but flexible criteria are
important to ensure fairness in each particular situation.
Local administrators will also have to make decisions about property
currently in public use. Whether to return the property or compensate the owner
depends once again on the value of the use. Property that is heavily and broadly
used, such as public roads, beaches, libraries, and local administrative buildings,
should remain in current use and claimants should be compensated. However,
there may be reasons not to maintain other public uses, such as government
agencies that are no longer accepted by the public.1"' This property could be
either returned to former owners or converted to another public use. Again, the
determination should focus on the value of the particular institution to the
public and the legitimacy of the current use of the property.
Transferring businesses formerly owned by "the people" to private owner-
ship is a particularly difficult problem. In assigning business ownership, the
decisionmakers should consider the value of the business to the East German
public. If the business is economically productive and provides jobs for the
community, it is worth preserving1t 2 In some cases, maintaining the business
might be consistent with the interests of property claimants, because the former
owners want to keep running the business for their own profit. In other cases,
former owners want to convert business property currently contributing to the
economy to their own private use, which would reduce the value of the property
to the community. A claimant's ownership rights should be honored only if her
proposed use of the property is compatible with current use. The claimant could
become a partial or total owner of the business, depending on her claim. If she
has no interest in participating in the business enterprise, she should receive
compensation instead of an ownership share. This solution honors the owners'
property rights and maintains the economic stability of the community, prevent-
ing businesses that contribute to the economic life of the community from
disappearing into private hands.
In addition to requiring that administrators consider the value and legitima-
cy of property use, any legislation regulating the adjudication of claims should
also seek to return property whenever possible. Except for claims to properties
used residentially or having very strong public or economic benefits for the
community, the policy should be to return property to owners. This must be
the rule rather than the exception; otherwise the local authorities, who may
obtained. One possible solution is to subdivide such properties, allowing current residents to remain on part
of the property and using the rest for other residences or public lands.
101. The Staatssicherheitsdienst (the state security, colloquially known as the Stasi) held property, but
the public now views this agency as corrupt. In a demonstration against the Stasi in January 1990, thousands
protested in front of its headquarters. Thomas Kleine-Brockhoff, Ohne Hat in Abgrunde blicken, DIE ZErT,
June 22, 1990, at 2. This agency has no public value and is not worth protecting against property claims.
In fact, some agencies have already vacated their buildings. Robert Leicht & Christian Wernicke, Das ist
der Sinn unserer Sisyphusarbeit, DIE ZEnT, July 27, 1990, at 4.
102. The Treuhandanstalt, or trustee agency, is charged with the responsibility of disposing of such
industries, by deciding whether to close them down or sell them to private owners.
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consider foreign claimants to be intruders, will be less likely to decide claims
in their favor. The emphasis on return of property will be fairer to former
owners. Ideally, these criteria will help make the decisions as uniform as
possible throughout the country.
2. Standard of Compensation in Cases of Expropriation
I advocate a standard of compensation found in customary international
law. This standard is used primarily in cases of government expropriation or
nationalization of property belonging to citizens of another country.103 It also
applies to cases in which the government is not the expropriating party, but fails
adequately to protect property from a taking. The present situation in Germany
does not fit this mold because the government from which compensation is
sought is not the same government that expropriated the property. While this
standard is not binding in the present German situation, it was developed for
reasons which make its application appropriate.
The principles of international law are helpful because the interests of
German claimants are close enough to those of plaintiffs in international expro-
priation cases to warrant similar compensation standards. International law
protects citizens of one state from the unjust acts of another state. The goal in
resolving German property claims is to rectify the past injustices of the East
German Government. Now that the new German Government has the capacity
to compensate those who lost properties, fairness dictates that it do so. Interna-
tional law standards of compensation, which are based on doing justice while
preserving stability, are well-suited to this situation.
There is some disagreement concerning the current international law stan-
dard of compensation for expropriation. While some commentators argue that
the standard requires full compensation for expropriated property,"" others
view the standard as more flexible, requiring merely "appropriate," and in some
cases only partial, compensation. 05
103. See M.H. Mendelson, Agora: What Price Expropriation? Compensation for Expropriation: The
Case Law, 79 AMI. J. INT'L L. 414 (1985) (discussing standard of compensation for expropriation of alien
property).
104. See Charles N. Brower, Current Developments in the Law of Expropriation and Compensation:
A Preliminary Survey of Awards of the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal, 21 INT'L LAW. 639, 658-664
(1987); Davis R. Robinson, Note and Comment, Expropriation in the Restatement (Revised), 78 AM. J.
INT'L L. 176 (1984); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS § 712 (l)(c) (1990).
105. See Oscar Schachter, Comment, Compensation for Expropriation, 78 AM. J. INT'L L. 121 (1984).
The case law does not definitively support either standard. Some decisions clearly adhere to the standard
of full compensation. See SEDCO, Inc. v. National Iranian Oil Co., 10 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 180 (1986);
Norwegian Shipowners' Claims (Nor. v. U.S.), I R.I.A.A. 307, 339-40 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 1922). Other
decisions have stated that partial compensation is appropriate under international law. INA Corp. v. Islamic
Republic of Iran, 8 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 373 (1985) (traditional standard of full compensation has
eroded). Still other decisions are interpreted differently by different commentators to support either standard.
Schachter, supra (arguing for appropriateness standard), and Mendelson, supra note 103 (arguing for full
compensation standard), interpret the Case Concerning Factory at Chorzow (Ger. v. Pol.), 1928 P.C.I.J. (set.
A) No. 17 (Sept. 13), to support their opposite conclusions.
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An alternative that bridges the gap between these two views is the hybrid
approach employed in Kuwait v. American Independent Oil Co. (Aminoil).1°6
The Aminoil tribunal argued that "the determination of the amount of an award
of 'appropriate' compensation is better carried out by means of an enquiry into
all the circumstances relevant to the particular concrete case than through
abstract theoretical discussion."" 7 The Aminoil tribunal found that the legiti-
mate expectations of the investor (Aminoil) and the need to preserve incentives
for foreign investment justified full compensation of the value of the company
as a going concern, rather than the less generous book value.105 According
to the logic of the Aminoil award, full compensation is appropriate when
circumstances and legitimate expectations support such a standard.
Following the guidelines set by the Aminoil award, it is not necessary for
purposes of compensation in the German situation to choose between the two
competing standards of compensation. The appropriate level of compensation
for claims on East German property is full compensation because of the nature
of the relief offered to former property owners. Only through such a compensa-
tion scheme can claimants whose properties cannot be returned be placed on
equal footing with those who regain ownership of their properties. Claimants
whose properties are returned can sell the property and receive full compensa-
tion in the form of current fair market value. It would therefore be unfair to
pay those claimants whose property cannot be returned anything less than the
fair market value of their lost property. The forms of relief should be as equal
as circumstances permit.
Ideally, the government should award all claimants full compensation.
However, because the German Government does not have unlimited resources
to devote to compensation, it may have to sacrifice the value of full compensa-
tion for equitable concerns and compensate all legitimate claims at less than
fair market value. 0 9 The limitations of the compensation fund might also be
addressed by awarding compensation in bonds that will take a number of years
to mature. In this way, the government would be able to award less than full
value for all claims and avoid a sudden financial drain from paying all claims
at once. More importantly, this approach avoids perpetuating past injustices by
compensating all claimants without exclusions.
In order to equalize the relief offered to those claimants receiving return
of their property and the relief offered to those receiving compensation, the
The case law weighs more heavily on the full compensation side of the scale, but some scholars insist
that there is not enough agreement in international case law decisions to support the requirement of full
compensation in every case. Schachter, supra, at 122.
106. 21 I.L.M. 976 (1982).
107. Id. at 1033. Note that the Aminoil tribunal's use of the term "appropriate" compensation means
compensation that is called for by the relevant circumstances. This meaning differs from the use of
"appropriate" as a code word for partial compensation. See supra note 105 and accompanying text.
108. 21 I.L.M. at 1033-34, 1041.
109. Marie-Luise Hauch-Fleck, Endspurt der Eigentinter DIE ZEIT, Oct. 26, 1990, at 7.
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ideal measure of compensation would be current fair market value. Current fair
market value would reflect the present economic worth of the property, which
is what the claimants would have now if their property had never been taken.
Assessing fair market value, however, presents a considerable problem particu-
larly with the German economy in its present state of flux.110 It will be very
difficult for local authorities adjudicating claims to determine compensation
with the market so unstable.
This difficulty can best be overcome by the local authorities who have the
power to adjudicate claims. These authorities are most attuned to the local
markets, because they are responsible for keeping records on property values.
Their assessments are most likely to take current market fluctuations into
account. No authority could easily determine the market value of German
property at present, but these administrators are best equipped to make such
findings. As long as the government provides fairly specific guidelines", for
them to follow in determining the economic value of property, these local
authorities will be able to facilitate the process.
If property cannot be returned according to these criteria, compensation of
claims is the best solution. When claimants receive compensation, they receive
the recognition of their rights that they deserve. Compensation of claims also
resolves the legal dilemmas of a claimant's entitlement to ownership, so that
the community in which the property is located can be certain that the property
will not be taken away in a legal proceeding. Resolving claims in this manner,
as expeditiously as possible, is the only way to ensure stability in an economi-
cally fragile eastern Germany while also doing justice to former East German
citizens whose properties were unfairly taken.
CONCLUSION
The policy recommendations of this Note are intended to describe how the
new German Government can best pursue the goals of justice, public stability,
and smooth unification. These goals are tremendously important for the devel-
opment of a healthy unified Germany. Balancing the rights of individuals with
the interests of the community as a whole is always difficult, but when two
systems with as radically different notions of this balance as those of East and
West Germany merge, thorny legal underbrush is inevitable. Despite the
difficulties, the government must develop a fair and efficient system of resolv-
ing rival claims. Certainty is fundamental to political development, particularly
for a country with a capitalist private property system. Newly unified Germany
has the basic requirements of such a system already in place. Quick and fair
110. For example, a claimant with property near the Berlin Wall might own a piece of property that
is currently in the middle of an abandoned area, but will probably be in the heart of the city in 10 or more
years.
111. Providing such detailed economic data is beyond the scope of this Note.
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resolution of disputed property claims will be an essential ingredient in bonding
the country together and securing the benefits of justice and public order for
all its citizens.

